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The Affect of Dissident Language 
and Aesthetic Emancipation at the 
Margins 
A Possible Dialogue between Theodor W. Adorno and 
Julia Kristeva 
Marcia Morgan 
Muhlenberg College 
If the written language codifies the estrangement of classes, redress cannot 
lie in regression to the spoken, but only in the consistent exercise of 
strictest linguistic objectivity. Only a speaking that transcends writing by 
absorbing it can deliver human speech from the lie that it is already 
human. 
Adorno, Minima Moralia1 
A Long Introduction 
In this paper I focus on the interaction between affect and language as 
articulated in the works of Theodor W. Adorno and Julia Kristeva, 
sometimes in inchoate and non-explicit ways. Language is always in transit, 
exile, and dispossession. All language is the language of another, or the 
other, and precisely because of this, it is the site of dissenting and conflicting 
affect. In this context, the present paper traces a missed but necessary 
dialogue between Adorno and Kristeva. A beginning point of conversation 
between them is the assertion of the loss of inner subjectivity, or a ‘private 
life’ of subjective inwardness. For Adorno, this is a necessary loss that comes 
with the breakdown of false ideology and its concomitant reification of the 
subject-object relation. The destruction of subjective inwardness takes place 
within a critique of the problematic ideological tendencies inherent within 
late monopoly capitalism and its culture industry. For Kristeva the loss of a 
subjective or private inwardness is an unavoidable consequence of the 
oppression caused by the symbolic order comprised of everyday language 
representative of the patriarchal status quo. In her writings Kristeva 
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elaborates the problematic dismantling of what she calls ‘intimacy’, and it is 
not immediately clear how Kristevan intimacy could relate to Adorno’s 
critique. While Adorno proceeds from the collapse of subjective inwardness 
toward a negative dialectic of emancipation through linguistic objectivity 
experienced aesthetically—by means of a speaking that transcends writing 
by absorbing it—Kristeva aims to reawaken intimacy as the possibility of 
dissent and dissidence. Crucial to my analysis is Kristeva’s opposition of her 
notion of intimacy to any form of sentimentality, regression to an 
unmediated unconscious, or a turn to any mere ‘private life’ separated from 
the social and political spheres. Could this possibly resonate with Adorno’s 
critique of the subject and the aesthetic theory that arises out of this critique? 
Adorno’s diagnosis of failed subjective inwardness was first presented 
in his monograph on Kierkegaard, the book titled Kierkegaard: Construction of 
the Aesthetic, written between the years 1929-1933, and published in 1933. It 
appeared in print on January 27, “the day that Hitler declared a national 
emergency and suspended freedom of the press, making his transition from 
chancellor to dictator.”2  Adorno’s Kierkegaard was meant to call out the 
fascistic tendencies internal to inward subjective ‘decisiveness’. Adorno 
sustained this critical theme throughout his entire collected writings, 
including in the posthumously published 1969 Aesthetic Theory. As Seyla 
Benhabib recently reminded us: “[…] for Adorno, thinking must resist the 
temptation to overpower the object, letting it instead appear and assert itself 
over against the epistemic imperialism of subjectivity.”3 Benhabib 
underscores “the primacy of the object” in Adorno, and describes 
compellingly how it “captures multiple epistemological, methodological, 
and even psychoanalytic dimensions” in his work.4 She recalls Adorno’s 
statement from Negative Dialectics that: “To use the strength of the subject to 
break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity—this is what the author 
felt to be his task ever since he came to trust his own mental impulses.”5 
And his first and foremost measure in doing so is to break down an 
assumed interior life of inner ‘decisionism’ of the subject. By decisionism I 
mean an irrational adherence to one’s falsely assumed capacity to make 
ethical, moral, religious choices without any mediation of socio-political life 
or other materially relevant, concrete contexts that impinge upon one’s 
subjectivity. 
In what follows, I will lay out Adorno’s forced collapsing of subjective 
interiority into a negative space that opens up aesthetic emancipatory 
potential. I then place Adorno’s negativity of subjective inwardness and the 
aesthetic potential after the fact of its destruction in dialogue with the work 
of Kristeva, who has also emphasized a subjective interiority of negativity 
but framed the latter in terms of the feminine, abjection and maternity. 
Although I engage Kristeva’s negativity, I distance my analysis from the 
shortcomings of her feminist theory—namely, its heteronormativity—and 
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problems with her psychoanalytic geopolitics. Although I agree with some 
of the feminist components of Kristeva’s writings, I do not agree with all of 
them. Much previous scholarship on Kristeva has focused on the question of 
whether she provides an acceptable feminist theory. This is not my focus in 
this article. Rather, I’m interested to highlight elements of her writings that 
speak to a broader framework of an aesthetic capacity for emancipation at 
the margins of contemporary society, across categories of race, gender, class, 
sexuality, disability and more. 
Adorno’s methodology of “us[ing] the strength of the subject to break 
through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity” is mirrored in Kristeva’s 
writings where she argues against the possibility of any substantive ‘subject’ 
and advocates instead for a subject-in-process that is ever in practice as a 
speak-ing subject, but never able to be objectivized as such. For Kristeva, the 
subject is never spoke-n; it never speaks its self as an object, but continually 
strives for a language that could represent its ongoing processual and 
contingent state of being. Kristeva’s examples of such subjectivity are 
intricately linked to her discussions of affect and intimacy. Her notion of 
intimacy is rooted in a conception of continual ‘returning’ or changement, a 
changing that provokes contestation and questioning at every juncture with 
stasis and any assumed progression of values, whereby one set of values 
would replace another in a more advanced manner.6 Her examples depict a 
subject as a striving for a language that does not become accumulated as an 
object; the subject does not become assimilated into the social whole but 
rather retains its heterogeneity and singularity. Does this mean that Kristeva 
is more subjective than Adorno would allow and/or that she fails to 
subjugate the individual to the primacy of the object? Would Adorno reject 
Kristeva’s emphasis on intimacy because of his commitment to consistent 
linguistic objectivity and his destruction of subjective interiority? I will 
attempt to answer these questions in the negative and thereby affirm a more 
productive collaboration between Adorno and Kristeva than might be 
construed by a cursory glance at their respective theories. It is important to 
note that two outstanding texts have already considered a connection 
between Adorno and Kristeva, one briefly and one substantively. In Kristeva 
and the Political Cecelia Sjöholm reads a brief theoretical sympathy between 
them, but construes their divergence in Adorno’s alleged foreclosing of the 
object.7 I disagree with Sjöholm’s reading of Adorno on this point and 
attempt to read Adorno and Kristeva together through their respective 
relationships to language. Ewa PŁonowska Ziarek has read a much more 
substantive relationship between Adorno and Kristeva, and has placed this 
within a conversation on specifically feminist writing, a focus from which my 
project is distanced, as noted above in regard to Kristeva’s feminism, 
although I find Ziarek’s monograph as a whole extremely helpful and 
provocative.8 
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The process of ‘striving for’ language and subjectivity in Kristeva makes 
itself manifest as experiences of affects, as a means to discover the failures of 
language through affectivity, initiated by the exclusion of heterogeneous and 
singular dimensions of the subject from the symbolic order of everyday 
language. The subject that comes to fruition has something in common with 
what Judith Butler describes in “Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the 
Question of ‘Postmodernism’” as follows: “[…] it is important to remember 
that subjects are constituted through exclusion, that is, through the creation 
of a domain of deauthorized subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection, 
populations erased from view.”9 Although Butler has been highly critical of 
Kristeva’s work,10 I nonetheless discern some analytic sympathies between 
their writings. The subjectivity just cited is what Butler has described in her 
essay on “Variations on Sex and Gender” as a subjective identity constituted 
through an ‘incessant’ repetition of acts that implode any linear temporality 
of selfhood, but continually attempt to re-ground their selves through 
performativity.11 In the context of Kristeva’s work, this yields a subject that 
remains necessarily ungrounded and yet definitely heard. It is a subject 
bound by sensed performativity of disruptive and dissenting affect vis-à-vis 
the object. I appreciate a reading of Adorno in sympathy with such an 
understanding of the subject while not diminishing the necessity of paying 
heed to the object. In fact, I aim to underscore this necessity. 
There are many powerful critiques of Kristeva that must be addressed 
here at the outset of my paper. Most relevant to my current analysis is 
Drucilla Cornell’s evaluation where she rejects Kristeva’s theory of language 
and subjectivity because it reinscribes the female as the other.12 (Judith 
Butler and Nancy Fraser have made equally negative assessments, although 
from perspectives different from each other and from Cornell’s.13) Because 
of her criticism of Kristeva, Cornell turns to Adorno’s version of negativity 
as an antidote to any staid binary formulations through non-identitarian 
thinking. In contrast to Cornell’s argument, I aim to show a common ground 
between Kristeva and Adorno through the positions of exclusion and 
dissidence, realized by both philosophers by means of the social situation of 
the art work. The latter instigates an undoing of social norms that facilitates 
aesthetic emancipation. Kristeva and Adorno are united in their belief in 
social-political emancipation through art. But this is no ‘artistic revolt’ as 
some commentators have concluded pejoratively. Although there are 
certainly limitations to what both Adorno and Kristeva have accomplished, 
respectively, in regard to the relationship between their aesthetic theories 
and the political,14 I argue that when their models are thought together a 
powerful framework can be achieved by which to construe a political 
capacity of aesthetic experience while not allowing art to become politicized 
through either constitutive ‘subjectivity’ or its equal and opposite—idealistic 
objectivity—both of which lead to propagandizing art and therefore 
manipulation of the subject. By a political capacity for emancipation that can 
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arise out of Adornian and Kristevan aesthetic experience, I mean the 
political as a capacity for contestation, not concretely applicable politics.15 In 
order to demonstrate this claim, I will finish my analysis by placing 
Kristeva’s linguistic theory of affect and dissidence in conversation with 
Adorno’s philosophy of the language of music, as one example of their 
shared framework for aesthetic emancipatory experience. In doing so I am 
relying on Albrecht Wellmer’s insights into the productively discordant 
relationship between language and music and what he helpfully pinpoints 
as the “rationalistic fiction” at the heart of Adorno’s aesthetics.16 This sheds 
a great deal of light on the striving for a language advocated by Adorno in 
his philosophy of music, which I contend resonates provocatively with 
Kristevan aesthetics.  
Ultimately, I claim that there is something similar between what 
Adorno and Kristeva each has to say regarding the relationship between 
affect and language when thought through the example of music. They both 
regard music (and literature, for that matter) as an exemplar of dissent and 
dissidence as an expression of social-political exclusion from the status quo 
of everyday normative language. There is nothing sentimental or private 
about what either philosopher seeks to accomplish; rather each has a social-
political goal. Their respective relationships to the political—as a capacity for 
contestation—are similar in that they are trying to think thinking and 
therefore language anew by examining the failure of language for 
singularity and heterogeneity, what Adorno calls the nonidentical and what 
Kristeva regards as the intimate. Both Adorno and Kristeva aim to capture 
the experience of this failure through aesthetics. The philosophy of music 
provided by Adorno and Kristeva strives for linguistic objectivity 
experienced affectively. The latter acts in contradistinction to the symbolic 
order (for Kristeva) and in sustained opposition to positive or idealistic 
dialectics in which subject and object would be equal and adequate to each 
other and therefore fall into a static and hence empty identitarian 
relationship (for Adorno).  
 
Adorno, the Collapse of Inward Subjectivity, and the 
Negative Space of Emancipation 
Throughout his expansive collection of writings, via different philosophic 
constellations, Adorno diagnoses the failure of subjective interiority or 
inwardness to emancipate the individual subject.  For example, in his early 
work, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, Adorno draws on the literary 
motif of the bourgeois intérieur, first thematized in collaboration with Walter 
Benjamin for Benjamin’s Arcades Project, in order to call out the collapsed 
space of failed subjective inwardness that Adorno critiques at the heart of 
Kierkegaard’s religious philosophy of existence.  Although I disagree with 
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Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard, as I have explained in detail in my 2012 
monograph, Kierkegaard and Critical Theory, nonetheless Adorno's reading is 
very instructive for an understanding of Adorno’s own aesthetic theory, as I 
argued in my dissertation.17 In Kierkegaard, in the section titled “Intérieur,” 
Adorno writes: 
The fitting name of the “situation,” as the powerless-
momentary indifferentiation of subject and object, is […] 
to be found in the imagery of the apartment interior, 
which, while it discloses itself only to interpretation, 
demands interpretation by its striking independence.  It is 
the bourgeois intérieur of the nineteenth century, before 
which all talk of subject, object, indifferentiation, and 
situation pales to an abstract metaphor, even though for 
Kierkegaard the image of the intérieur itself serves only as 
a metaphor for the nexus of his fundamental concepts.  
The relation is reversed as soon as interpretation gives up 
the compulsion of identity that is exerted even by 
Kierkegaard’s idea of situation, which indeed exclusively 
occurs as the actual site of inward decisiveness.18 
From this passage and from the broader context of Adorno’s Kierkegaard 
critique, we can see the interpolation of the social space into the private 
domain of subjective space, for the social space both colonizes and reifies the 
private domain.  The private space retreats into Kierkegaardian “inward 
decisiveness,” only to invert its own situation – against its intention and self-
interpretation— therefore, making explicit its embeddedness in the social 
“situation.”  Because of the failed space of inward subjectivity, Adorno turns 
to an aesthetic that facilitates moments—albeit transitory, fleeting ones—of 
emancipation from the oppression of social norms. 
 According to Max Pensky in his early book, Melancholy Dialectics, 
through the image of the bourgeois intérieur Adorno has caused one facet of 
Kierkegaard’s writing to explode the static emptiness that Adorno indicts as 
the final product of Kierkegaard’s inwardness.19  Similarly, in The Origin of 
Negative Dialectics Susan Buck-Morss synthesizes Adorno’s forced implosion 
of private, isolated subjectivity in the following way: 
Adorno’s historical image aimed at demythification by 
transforming the symbolic relationships established by 
Kierkegaard’s words into dialectical ones.  By bringing 
Kierkegaard’s philosophical contents into critical 
juxtaposition with symbols from the historical reality 
which had been their source, Adorno transformed 
Kierkegaard’s eternally fixed images (which ruled over 
the individual fatalism of an astrological sign) into 
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dynamic, historical constellations: he set their elements in 
motion so that they negated the very concepts they were 
intended to symbolize.20 
 
The explosion of static emptiness in Adorno’s critique of subjective 
interiority creates “dynamic, historical constellations” by provoking thought; 
I wish to explore this in more detail in and through its impact on Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory.  Following Benjamin’s dictum that “Truth is the death of 
intention,”21 Adorno thwarts the aim of Kierkegaard’s nineteenth-century 
aesthetic interior – to reach the heart of privacy and inwardness in the 
aesthetic domain – into a collapsed space of failed subjectivity.  In fact, for 
Adorno, the interior space of Kierkegaardian subjectivity is no space at all.  
Adorno writes: “[…] the force of the material goes beyond the intention of 
the metaphor.  The intérieur is accentuated in contrast to the horizon, not just 
as the finite self in contrast to the supposedly erotic-aesthetic infinitude, but 
rather as an objectless inwardness vis-à-vis space.  Space does not enter the 
intérieur; it is only its boundary.”22  But the failure of this aesthetic space will 
be also its redemption, because it infuses a dialectic into the void within 
which the position of the romantic aesthetic has been rendered into 
philosophical rubble.  Adorno utilizes the place of failed subjectivity in 
which subject and object have been forced into a static equation as a 
transitional point to hope for the appearance of “the new.”  This motif 
substantiates Adorno’s anti-identitarian thinking.  The dialectical movement 
enters the remains of the domestic interior and faciliates the appearance of 
what has not yet existed.  Thinking “the new” enables the experience of the 
nonidentical.  Consciousness cannot master the new; it cannot even grasp 
the new – hence Albrecht Wellmer’s description of “the rationalistic fiction” 
at the heart of Adorno’s thinking.  But the striving for the new – as an 
infinite process of unraveling the ever-same and simultaneously 
constructing what challenges the static – constitutes a negative dialectic 
praxis internal to artworks. This brings up their “situation,” or what is 
referred to as their “Ortsbestimmung” in the German original of Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory, which was already a prominent theme in Adorno’s 
Kierkegaard  book. This is relevant to my analysis because Ortsbestimmung 
translates as the determination of place, localization, or fixation of position. 
Here we are reminded of the shattering of the bourgeois intèrieur through 
Adorno’s Kierkegaard critique. The place from which to determine the 
artwork can lie only in the margins, in exile. It belongs everywhere and 
nowhere contemporaneously, as a rationalistic fiction of the new without 
being able to seize it conceptually. This is both its freedom and its limitation. 
The Ortsbestimmung of the emancipating aesthetic experience recognizes the 
double-bind of its fixedness in a place that has never been. This gives it an 
object-like character that is also its praxis: the non-identical must always be 
strived for and can never reside in any one space. Art must empty itself of 
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content in order to make way for aesthetic emancipation; thus art redeems 
itself through its own self-abnegation. Hence the title of Adorno’s 
Kierkegaard book: “The Construction of the Aesthetic.” Adorno forced 
“Kierkegaard” into an aesthetic construction that would self-destruct. The 
seeds of this maneuver were already within Kierkegaard’s corpus, according 
to Adorno, and he brought them to implode. In order to do this, Adorno 
constructs a practical activity of the artwork that empties the voluptuous 
space of bourgeois art and displaces the latter into “life”—beyond the 
domain of private spaces and into the public sphere. This becomes 
particularly ironic through Adorno’s advocacy for art that is rather difficult 
to decipher: in refusing accessibility, difficult artworks become the most 
equitably created: they become available to all because they are inadequately 
grasped by anyone. Again, they belong everywhere and nowhere, hence 
their egalitarianism. The praxical comportment of difficult artworks shifts 
the ownership of art from the upper-middle class to an onus on each 
individual living subject to decipher any given artwork in a new manner. 
The philistine is no longer excluded from the means of high art, and the 
aesthetic nobility can no more lay claim to the comfort of the artwork as the 
material of their own private living room. By grasping Adorno’s critique of 
the empty, or negative interiority of subjective inwardness, we achieve a 
renewed understanding of aesthetic emancipation via “thinking anew”—
within the imaginative parameters facilitated in the face of oppressive, 
administrative regimes of appearances. 
 
Kristeva, Negative Interiority in Exile, and Liberation 
 Adorno’s aesthetic theory has been touted by many diverse critical 
theorists for the nonidentitarian space it provides liberatory experience. 
Drucilla Cornell, for one, has relied on the negativity of Adorno’s thinking 
as an antidote to the shortcomings of Kristeva’s feminist linguistics. In line 
with this, Kristeva has been rebuked for hypostatizing gender categories and 
forgetting their possible excesses outside the space of their presence as 
binaries because of her reliance on Lacanian psychoanalysis. In addition to 
Cornell’s unfavorable assessment, Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser, in 
Rethinking French Feminism, strike different registers but are equally 
totalizing in their negative evaluation of Kristeva’s work. However, I want 
to show another side of Kristeva’s thinking distanced from the gender 
binary in her writings; I am trying to hear Kristeva’s linguistics differently 
through “a speaking that transcends writing by absorbing it.” In the spirit of 
Amy Allen’s methodology in The Power of Feminist Theory, we can interpret 
seminal figures in ways that “make them groan,”23 forcing them to contort 
their frameworks into more productive arrangements and generative 
constellations with seemingly incongruous or even unsympathetic thinkers. 
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In this way, I am trying to read Adorno with Kristeva, while also reading 
Kristeva against her own binaric shortcomings in her gender theory. 
Drucilla Cornell points to a simultaneous destructiveness and creativity 
in the role Kristeva assigns the feminine in language. I argue that this 
double-move of creativity and destructiveness in Kristeva bears similarity to 
Adorno’s negativity via aesthetic experience. In “Feminism, Negativity, 
Subjectivity,” Cornell and co-author Adam Thurschwell write: 
For Kristeva, feminine negativity is the unrepresentable, 
nonviolent disruptor of all fixed linguistic and social codes 
[…]. Kristeva’s ‘femininity’ is both destructive power and 
life-enabling source. In it she sees the potential and home 
of a mode of relatinv that is captured by neither the 
repressive totality nor hierarchized difference. However, 
we will suggest that Kristeva’s sole reliance on the 
negative makes this goal unreachable, and indeed brings 
her very close to the very tendencies she wants to avoid.24 
Although they claim that Kristeva shares the ethos of Marcuse’s negativity 
as “the liberatory impulse of the social process,” which aims to distinguish “ 
‘all pseudo- and crackpot’ “ opposition from true negativity, Cornell and 
Thurschwell want to remedy certain shortcomings in Kristeva’s linguistic 
analyses of the female as the negative in language by turning to Adorno’s 
anti-identitarian framework.25 Negativity in Adorno can be understood as a 
result of the wrong state of things. Such a formulation lends itself to 
Kristeva’s work, but in a way not previously recognized. Kristeva’s “sole 
reliance on the theme of the negative,” which ends as a utopia of jouissance, 
has been contrasted with an analysis of negativity that would allow us “to 
know what such a world would look like in a concrete setting.”26 In order to 
arrive there, Cornell and Thurschwell turn to Adorno’s critique of Hegel and 
conclude that “Hegel’s central error lies in his attempt to recuperate 
Negativity in the Concept self-consciously returned to Itself […]. Adorno’s 
negative dialectics free Hegel’s insight [into the Negative] from the confines 
of his system.”27 This was the move in Adorno’s Kierkegaard critique 
elicited by Adorno’s reenactment within Kierkegaard’s writings of the 
positive idealism both Adorno and Kierkegaard attribute to Hegel. 
Regardless of what one regards the most compelling version of Hegelian 
negativity, what matters for the purposes of my analysis in this paper is 
Adorno’s attempt to bring the structure of subjective interiority crumbling 
down (as we saw exemplified in his Kierkegaard book), in order then to 
create a new space of negativity for the not-yet-existing and ever new. 
Adorno’s methodology ends in a negative space of aesthetic emancipation 
similar to what Kristeva constructs through her political writings—that is, in 
her writings of existence at the margins: as the dissident, the foreigner, the 
abject. By turning to Kristeva’s writings about dissidence and the excluded 
abstracted from her concrete applications and her psychoanalytic 
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geopolitics, we can think Kristeva and Adorno together in an understanding 
of negative interiority via aesthetic experience. 
 What do I mean by the negative space in Kristeva and its link to 
emancipatory experience? This is an important question because I intend the 
answer as one of the main connections of her work to Adorno. Consider 
again the lack of space in Adorno’s diagnosis of Kierkegaardian inwardness 
and the construction of the aesthetic after the downfall of the constitutive 
subject (analyzed in Part I of this paper). As Adorno argues in the 
Kierkegaard book: “Space does not enter the intérieur; it is only its 
boundary.”28  If the space is no space at all, it is an Archimedean point 
attempted by the subject to establish the self indubitably and eternally, a 
continued haunting by the “Cartesian ghost”—precisely the opposite of 
Kristeva’s approach to the subject as a subject-in-process as-process of speak-
ing. Emancipation for both Adorno and Kristeva takes place in the space on 
the border of the subject, as a margin or threshold with the object. This is a 
negative space in relation to the subject because the subject cannot grasp it; it 
can only posit the space that lies on the perimeter of its own failure as a 
subject. Think of Adorno’s dictum that “philosophy is more than bustle only 
where it risks total failture,” only where it borders on the complete 
destruction of subjectivity in order to make space for the appearance of the 
object. This process shows the necessity of thinking—and speaking—at the 
margins of the social-political sphere where subjectivity has ended and 
linguistic objectivity can begin. What I have described as a negative space in 
Adorno has been well explicated in the secondary literature as a threshold or 
chronotope in Kristeva’s writings. These conceptions bear an interesting and 
helpful relationship to the political as a capacity for contestation. 
 In her brief article, “A New Type of Intellectual: The Dissident,” 
published in 1977, as Toril Moi recapitulates: 
Kristeva puts the case for a new form of political 
engagement among intellectuals, an engagement that 
would escape the old master-slave dialectics outlined by 
Hegel. In her description of the new politics of 
marginality, she indicates how a move away from the 
purely verbal level of politics (mentioning colour, sound 
and gesture as alternatives) would mobilize the forces 
necessary to break up the symbolic order and its law. The 
article, however, does not reject law and society; rather it 
hopes for a new law and a different society. Drawing on 
the experience of marginality and exile, whether physical 
or cultural, the intellectual can still spearhead a certain 
kind of subversion of Western bourgeois society.29 
M a r c i a  M o r g a n  |  1 7 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.716 
Kristeva’s article on “The New Type of Intellectual” challenges closed 
society and its groups (the Nation, the Family, the State, the Party) and its 
technocratic and administrative forms of discourse. There we see Kristeva 
breaking out of the master-slave dichotomy some of the feminist critics I 
have mentioned (Cornell, Butler, Fraser) have accused her linguistic 
analyses of repeating. As Kristeva argues: “Whether or not the master is the 
Greatest Number and Everyone’s Idea of Good, this cannot hide the fact that 
this dichotomy induces a kind of pro-slavery mentality in the intellectual, 
who represents the supreme product of the systematic conjunction of 
Christianity and capitalist production.”30 This claim resonates with 
Adorno’s critique of Kierkegaard. The Christian philosopher, Adorno 
alleges, reinforces bourgeois principles through the retreat to the domestic 
interior as the paradigmatic space of private capital. But it furthermore 
reveals Kristeva’s own turn away from the dichotomous us-them 
relationality appropriated within her feminist semiotics. She writes further 
in “The Dissident” article: 
[...] [t]he role of the Western intellectual has been reduced 
to patching up social groups. The intellectuals (a separate 
sociological entity made necessary by the present 
development of productive forces) have used their 
superior historical perspective inherited from the 
nineteenth century to devote themselves to a cause whose 
ideal of social and economic equality is evidence but 
which serves both to swallow up the particular 
characteristics of intellectual work and to perpetuate the 
myth of a successful society whose messianism, when not 
Utopian, has turned out to border on totalitarianism. 
Whether euro-communist or note, the future of Western 
society will greatly depend on a re-evaluation of the 
relationship of the masses to the individual or intellectual, 
and on our ability to break out of the dialectical trap 
between these oppositions and to recast the whole 
relationship.31 
In this passage Kristeva highlights the slippage about which Adorno 
likewise remarked, namely, the slide from nineteenth-century bourgeois 
subjectivity to twentieth-century identitarianism, catastrophically realized in 
the most oppressive social-political forms and their totalitarian regimes of 
appearances. Like Adorno, Kristeva seeks to upend this trajectory and craft 
out of the destructiveness a newfound aesthetic materiality of the social 
situation from the position of exile. Both are fighting against maligned 
notions of progress and enlightenment in Western European contemporary 
culture. She argues for ‘new languages’ rooted in sense, sound, color and 
gesture. Kristeva claims:  
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In the wake of a Christianity in a state of terminal crisis, 
one sees only too well how modern art, whether painting, 
music or literature, is an attempt to achieve sublimation 
even when it inevitably borders on psychosis or mental 
disorder. But the modern community is given a new status 
by the practice of this independent avant-garde, and 
above all by the spread of underground culture to the 
masses. There is a new synthesis between the sense, 
sound, gesture and colour, the master discourses begin to 
drift and the simple rational coherence of cultural and 
institutional codes breaks down. It is on this background 
that we can perceive a new status of the modern 
community.32 
Important for my analysis, Kristeva concludes that “these new languages 
use the group to question particular forms of subjectivity or the 
unconscious.”33 
 Kristeva and Adorno meet in exile. They collaborate in the margins of 
their respective aesthetic theories where they extradite identity thinking into 
the ‘no longer’ and make room for the ‘not yet’. The language that unites 
them is an artistic one irreducible to dichotomous constructions as well as 
subject-object idealisms, and yet it must meet what Adorno calls the 
“strictest linguistic objectivity.” In the next part of my paper, I will 
investigate what this means in the domain of music and how it is possible. 
Meanwhile, we can grasp the dissident dimension in Kristevan linguistics 
experienced aesthetically when she writes: “A playful language therefore 
gives rise to a law that is overturned, violated and pluralized, a law upheld 
only to allow a polyvalent, polylogical sense of play that sets the being of the 
law ablaze in a peaceful, relaxing void.”34 This void—akin to an Adornian 
negative space of aesthetic emancipation—is experienced affectively as a 
form of desire that “is stripped down to its basic structure: rhythm, the 
conjunction of body and music, which is precisely what is put into play 
when the linguistic I takes hold of this law.”35 At this juncture, the dialogue I 
have attempted to set up between Adorno and Kristeva will delve into the 
“conjunction of body and music” and resonate within the parameters of a 
philosophy of the language of music, in order to demonstrate a powerful 
aesthetic theory of liberation at the margins of language. As Kristeva has 
written in “My Memory’s Hyberbole,” “The labyrinths of the speaking subject 
–the microcosm of a complex logic whose effects had only partially surfaced 
in society— led us directly toward regions that were obscure but crucial, 
specific but universal, particular but transhistorical, far from society’s 
policed scenarios.”36 So far I have sought to evince another way of seeing—
or rather hearing—Kristeva’s philosophy of the Other through similarities 
with Adorno’s aesthetic theory, after both the destructiveness and 
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destruction of subjective interiority and the subsequent opening for thinking 
anew. 
 
Music and Language: A Productively Discordant 
Relationship 
Recent scholarship in critical theory questions its normative foundations and 
calls us to deprovincialize and decolonize critical theory.37 The seeds for this 
were already sewn in the feminist critiques in critiquing the reification of 
critique.38 In this context, I find a joint experiment with Adorno and Kristeva 
provocative. What Kristeva calls the symbolic order, what Adorno criticizes 
as positive dialectics, can be placed within the context of everyday language 
and the reification of norms: the language of patriarchal institutions, the 
language of the unreflected natural attitude. I am interested to show that 
Kristeva and Adorno are working on similar moves within their respective 
challenges to the linguistic status quo, and in the way in which they are 
doing it, although certainly some components of their projects diverge and 
even clash.  
Let me turn now to the philosophy of the language of music as a 
culmination of my analysis. Throughout her collected writings, but most 
specifically in the early works, Revolution in Poetic Language (published 1974 
in France, 1984 in the U.S.) and Language the Unknown (published 1981 in 
France, 1989 in the U.S.), Kristeva repeatedly references music as an 
examplar of artistic creation that “questions the omnivalence of the sign and 
meaning,” therefore “mak[ing] the problematic that stops semiotics 
evident.”39 In her linguistics Kristeva theorizes that the symbolic order 
oppresses but is also in a constant dynamic with the semiotic domain of the 
corporeal, material pre-linguistic realm coextensive with heterogeneity, 
singularity, and desire. I would like to highlight features of her language 
theory for music that speak to what I have presented already. In Language the 
Unknown Kristeva argues that music is “a differential system without 
semantics, a formalism that does not signify.”40 Could this be close to the 
“consistent linguistic objectivity” intended by Adorno, when thought within 
his philosophy of music?  
In Language the Unknown Kristeva includes a brief analysis of musical 
language in the culminating chapter of the book, the chapter on “Semiotics.” 
In these pages she rejects both “the subjective and vague discourse that 
floods music treatises” as well as “precise but purely technical studies.”41 
Similar to Adorno, she wants answers to the question that asks in what way 
music is a language, and by what means it can be clearly, even “radically,” 
distinguished from verbal language. In regard to terms such as “musical 
language,” “semantics,” “morphology,” and the “syntax” of music, Kristeva 
inquires what kind of “specific system” is “the signifying system of 
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music.”42 Her response is that the similarities between the system of the 
language of music and the system of verbal language are indeed 
“considerable.” Consider the following passage from Language the Unknown: 
Verbal language and music are both realized by utilizing 
the same material (sound) and by acting on the same 
receptive organs. The systems both have writing systems 
that indicate their entities and their relations. But while 
the two signifying systems are organized according to the 
principle of the difference of the components, this 
difference is not of the same order in verbal language as it 
is in music. Binary [phonematic] [my bracketing] 
differences are not pertinent in music. The musical code is 
organized by the arbitrary and cultural (imposed within the 
frameworks of a certain civilization) difference between 
various vocal values: notes.43 
There is something alternative in the language of music that does not 
yield meaning in the sense of verbal language. Music “takes us to the limit of 
the system of the sign.”44 It gives us a system of differences that does not 
mean something, as is the case with verbal language. Again, she calls music a 
“differential system without semantics, a formalism that does not signify.”45 
I ask in turn whether, in its lack of meaning, it is more capable of resisting 
the symbolic order than verbal language?  Could this relate to the ‘linguistic 
objectivity’ intended by Adorno? How could this be possible if the musical 
code includes components that are arbitrary and culturally imposed? This 
would seem to be the implications of her description. Let me re-trace the 
steps of my argument: I am exploring the relationship between language 
and affect. I began by thinking through Adorno’s imperative that “only a 
speaking that transcends writing by absorbing it” no longer lies that it is 
human. Such a speaking recaptures the human in the form of linguistic 
objectivity. How? What kind of speaking does this? This is not speech in the 
normative sense because this is “regressive” to constitutive subjectivity and 
idealist dialectics for Adorno and oppressive within the symbolic order for 
Kristeva. It is through a speak-ing subject that is not constituted, but rather 
aesthetic and political at the same time. How? Music is the example for both 
Adorno and Kristeva in what can carry this out. 
Kristeva tells us that semiotics can do two things with music: 1) it can 
“study the formal organization of different musical texts,” and 2), “it can 
establish the common ‘code,’ the common musical ‘language’ of an era or 
culture.” Therefore, the “degree of communicability of a particular musical 
text” relies on “its resemblance to or difference from the musical code of the 
time.”46 The more a musical text resembles the musical ‘code’ of its time, the 
less it communicates. Music that is truly communicative creates its own new 
code. Such music partakes of the semiotic realm, in contrast to the symbolic 
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language she finds oppressive and which forecloses on heterogeneity and 
individuality. She cites Schoenberg’s work as a search for a language, not a 
language itself: “The idea of sound itself comes to occupy the preponderant 
position—a new syntax and specific new forms […].”47  Schoenberg serves 
as Kristeva’s main example. This places her in an interesting alliance with 
Adorno’s philosophy of the language of music. Kristeva is attracted to the 
idea of a new code that breaks the system of previous linguistic structures 
and thereby enables emancipation from the symbolic order.  
 Let us think about this in relationship to Adorno’s philosophy of 
music. In Quasi Una Fantasia in a fragment on music and language Adorno 
offers the following analysis: 
Music resembles a language. Expressions such as musical 
idiom, musical intonation, are not simply metaphors. But 
music is not identical with language. The resemblance 
points to something essential, but vague. Anyone who 
takes it literally will be seriously misled. Music resembles 
language in the sense that it is a temporal sequence of 
articulated sounds which are more than just sounds. They 
say something, often something human [my emphasis]. The 
better the music, the more forcefully they say it. The 
succession of sounds is like logic: it can be right or wrong. 
But what has been said cannot be detached from the 
music. Music creates no semiotic system.48 
Music is the example for Adorno of a speaking that offers something human, 
a speaking that transcends written language. While Adorno regards music 
to have a conceptual-like constitution, he is careful to delimit the language of 
music from conceptual language itself. Music entails what he calls “ciphers,” 
which are “always capable of entering into a particular context.” He claims 
that music “does contain things that come very close to the ‘primitive 
concepts’ found in epistemology. It makes use of recurring ciphers.” Not to 
regard this as a positive statement, it serves as the beginning of Adorno’s 
critique of sedimented and reified musical elements foundational to 
harmony and voice leading, which he opposes through his celebration of 
works such as Schoenberg’s. So when Adorno contends that music’s ciphers 
“come close” to primitive concepts in epistemology, he means this as what is 
culturally to be overcome, similar to Kristeva’s critique of the symbolic 
order.   
The repeating ciphers in music make it difficult for those trained in 
tonality to let go of it. The ciphers: 
become sedimented like a second nature […] But the new 
music [such as that of Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, to 
name just three examples] rises up in rebellion against the 
illusion implicit in second nature. It dismisses as 
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mechanical these congealed formula and their function. 
However, it does not dissociate itself entirely from the 
analogy with language, but only from its reified version 
which degrades the particular into a token, into the 
superannuated signifier of fossilized subjective meanings. 
Subjectivism and reification go together in the sphere of 
music as elsewhere. But their correlation does not define 
music’s similarity to language once and for all. In our day 
the relationship between music and language has become 
critical.49 
The language of music is different for Adorno because of its distance 
from the language of intentionality. But he also regards a theological 
dimension in music that could be related to Kristeva’s notion of intimacy 
through the connection of sensuousness experienced in a messianic context. 
Where music has no signitive meaning for Kristeva, it embodies ambiguity 
and vagueness for Adorno. Adorno rejects a semiotic dimension in music 
but attributes “incipient intentions” to musical meaning, to be distinguished 
from the unambiguous constructions of intentional language. Music need 
not be consoled for its curse of ambiguity, according to Adorno, because, 
through its mythic aspect “intentions are poured into it,” however, in a way 
that keeps the intentions “hidden.” What kind of intentions does music then 
perform? They are not conceptually grounded; they are linked to what he 
calls a theological dimension. And they imply mythic content, and are, 
perhaps most important— human. Music’s intentions are hidden and yet 
manifestly experienced through the continued generative capacity of 
musical performance and listening.  Music is interpreted by playing more 
music; musical meaning lies in its performance, not in its correspondence 
with intentional language. There is nothing sentimental or subjective to this; 
but there might be what Kristeva allows under the name of intimacy. 
Adorno creates an intimate sphere of musical expression that cannot be 
reduced to mere “elusive individual intentions” or “intentionless content”50; 
remember, he is striving for linguistic objectivity and made his first move in 
this direction against Kierkegaard’s alleged “objectless intentions.” Adorno 
rejects “transitory and adventitious meanings in music.”51 But this is also no 
mere formalism. He is careful to define this:  
Every musical phenomenon points to something beyond 
itself by reminding us of something, contrasting itself with 
something or arousing our expectations. The summation 
of such a transcendence of particulars constitutes the 
‘content’; it is what happens in music. But if musical 
structure or form is to be more than a set of didactic 
systems, it does not just embrace the content from outside; 
it is the thought process by which content is defined. 
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Music becomes meaningful the more perfectly it defines 
itself in this sense—and not because its particular elements 
express something symbolically. It is by distancing itself 
from language that its resemblance to language finds its 
fulfillment.52 
What Adorno calls ‘the new music’ invites our expectation by grasping 
language as a thinking that hears the delimitation from language. The new 
music provokes our assumed intentions in a way that is not itself linguistic, 
but rather affective. New music thwarts our presumptions as it relies on 
sedimented ciphers. In this way, music is a speaking that transcends the 
written sign by absorbing it. This can only be felt in the phenomenon of the 
affect by listening to and performing musical innovation. 
 For Adorno, ‘the new music’ makes explicit as a sensuous experience 
what is already taking place as the self-alienating process within language 
itself, indeed within the language we hold to be most dear and closest to our 
native conceptions of our selves: our mother tongue. In a chapter in the 2012 
publication, Beyond the Mother Tongue: The Postmonolingual Condition, 
Yasemin Yildiz recapitulates Adorno’s argument that language is neither 
natural nor arbitrarily constructed as a relationship between signifier and 
signified.53 I agree in this context with both Yildiz and with Peter 
Hohendahl’s claim in Prismatic Thought that for Adorno the semantic and 
semiotic are not separated and arbitrary, but related. This places Adorno’s 
philosophy of language well in conversation with Kristeva’s in regard to 
their shared understanding of a meaning that arises in between a process of 
grasping thought and manifested truth, as a battling interplay between the 
mutually reliant semiotic and semantic domains. Yildiz demonstrates 
forcefully that: “Words partake of truth and therefore are not arbitrary signs, 
but also […] are nevertheless not organic.”54 Adorno therefore positions his 
notion of language against a monolingual paradigm according to which the 
mother tongue would be the site of pure origin. He relies rather on the 
notion of the Fremdwort (foreign-derived word, not ‘foreign word’ as it has 
been translated) in the mother tongue so that homogeneous and fully 
familiar language becomes impossible.55 Yildiz argues: “In an unexpected 
way, then, this philosopher, who has been criticized for his privileging of 
German over other languages, reveals the different dimension of that which 
is fremd (foreign, alien, strange) within the ‘mother tongue’ and participates 
in a critically postmonolingual move beyond that linguistic family romance 
of maternal origin and purity.”56 This adds a particularly productive tension 
to a dialogue between Adorno’s philosophy of language and Kristeva’s 
linguistics, in particular as a challenge to her semiotic claim of a maternal 
origin of language. But certainly we can read this not as a ‘pure’ linguistic 
origin for Kristeva, rather as a place of abjection and sensuousness, as a 
return and changement that undergirds the dynamic interplay between the 
symbolic order and semiotic maternality and negativity. Regardless of how 
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this tension could be further developed or speculated upon, both 
philosophers are in agreement against a ‘prisonhouse’ of everyday language 
and against facile forms of communication that foster administrative forms 
of rationality. 
 Adorno references the Fremdwort in the mother tongue as a way to 
articulate language as both produced (rather than naturally unfolding) and 
meaningful (rather than arbitrary). In his essay “Über den Gebrauch von 
Fremdwörten [On the Use of Foreign-Derived Words]” Adorno claims: 
“This is why the life of language is not lived with the teleological rhythm of 
creaturely life with birth, growth, and death, but rather with naming as the 
enigmatic ur-phenomenon in between grasping thought and manifested 
truth, with crystallization as well as disintegration.”57 For Adorno foreign-
derived words display their man-made nature openly. They therefore “serve 
as reminders of the origin of language in the acts of naming. In this manner, 
not the ‘native’ words, but these categorically strange words relate back to 
the moment of emergence of originary language.” Yildiz continues:  
Whereas original acts of naming are located in a mythical 
framework, the Fremdwort as an act of naming is a profane 
reminder of a theologically informed origin. In their 
profanity, Fremdwörter are historical; they are ‘points at 
which cognizing consciousness irrupts’. What enters 
through them is freedom, as they signify the ‘incursion of 
freedom’ […] The nonorganic, unassimilated existence of 
foreign-derived words testifies to a more general 
disjuncture in society, according to Adorno […] The 
foreignness of words is thus a site at which social relations 
become legible.58 
Adorno has tried to capture precisely this dynamic of language that exposes 
the rift in social relations and the irruption of freedom into cognitive 
consciousness through the musical aesthetic experience.59 Adorno’s 
philosophy of the language of music attempts to capture the foreign-derived 
sense of all naming structures constitutive of originary language acquisition. 
In this sense all language is the language of another, or the other, and 
because of this the site of contesting affect.  
 
Affect, the Transformed Subject, and New Constellations 
of Collectivity 
What is then the connection between what I have worked out between affect 
and language, on one hand, and emancipation, on the other hand? Sara 
Ahmed has provided insightful scholarship on affect in Kristeva in regard to 
transformed subjectivity and its newfound potential for a collectivity that is 
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open and non-oppressive vis-à-vis all others, including “the stranger 
within.” Ahmed claims rightfully that in Kristeva’s work, even in its most 
political constellations, for example, in her discussions of nationhood, 
“emotions are ever present: whether in the passionate attachments to 
nationhood, or in the shame and pride of failing or living up to the national 
ideal. Here, [Ahmed considers] the role of emotion in aligning individual 
and collective, and the way in which such emotions do not come from either 
the inside (psyche) or the outside (collective), but allow for the very 
surfacing of bodies and collectives.”60 Ahmed draws on Kristeva’s early 
work on Powers of Horror (1982) by etymologically evoking the literal 
connection among emotion, attachment, and being moved: “The word 
‘emotion’ comes from the Latin emovere, suggesting “to be moved, to be 
moved out,” and “[w]hat moves us, what makes us feel, is also that which 
holds us in place, or gives us a dwelling place.”61 We are reminded of Kant’s 
description of aesthetic reflective judgment which manifests as a feeling that 
causes us to want to linger—although Kant means this in a non-emotional 
sense of feeling—, to while away in the midst of that which has moved us, as 
he writes in the third Critique.62 Yet, for Kristeva this fixedness in place has 
inherent within it a contingency that yields a connection between the contact 
that emotions move us to make and the contingency of those points of 
contact. Ahmed reminds us that the “The word ‘contingency’ has the same 
root in Latin as the word ‘contact’ (Latin: contingere: com-, tangere, to touch)” 
and she concludes from this word history that: 
Contingency is linked then to metonymy and proximity, 
to getting close enough to both touch another and be 
moved by another. So what attaches us, what connects us 
to this or that place, or to this or that other, such that we 
cannot stay removed from this other, is also what moves us, 
or what affects us such that we are no longer in the same 
place. Hence movement does not cut the body off from the 
‘where’ of its inhabitance, but connects bodies to other 
bodies—indeed, attachment takes place through 
movement, through being moved by the proximity of 
others. Emotions are bound up with how we inhabit the 
world ‘with’ others. Since emotions are, in the 
phenomenological sense, always intentional, and are 
‘directed’ towards an object or other (however imaginary), 
then emotions are precisely about the intimacy of the 
‘with’ […] Such intensifications of feeling create the very 
effect of the distinction between inside and outside, or 
between the individual and the collective, which allows 
the ‘with’ to be felt in the first place.63 
Ahmed then engages in an analysis of pain in Freud’s The Ego and the Id. This 
leads her to theorize the creation of the surface of the body and therefore the 
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boundary of the self. But she is careful not to ontologize pain or suffering as 
the cause of the formation of the self: “Rather, it is through the flow of 
sensations and feelings that become conscious as pain and pleasure that 
different surfaces are established […] [t]he transformation affected by 
recognizing a sensation as painful […] also involves the reconstitution of 
bodily space.”64 This brings us back to Adorno, the breakdown of the space of 
subjective interiority, and the construction a negative space of subjectivity as 
a border with the formerly constituted subject—through aesthetic 
emancipation.  
Ahmed summarizes her argument about affect and the transformation 
of subjectivity into a contingent being with ever-developing borders open to 
questions by others and to questioning the dominance of the ‘stranger 
within’. Ahmed writes: “What this argument suggests is that feelings are not 
about the inside getting out or the outside getting in, but that they affect the 
very distinction between inside and outside in the first place. Clearly, to say 
that feelings are crucial to the forming of surfaces and borders is also to 
suggest that what makes those borders also unmakes them.”65 Affect can 
“question the integrity of the subject” or become involved “in the very 
making of boundaries.”66 The affective release provoked by listening to 
what both Adorno and Kristeva cite as an exemplar—the “new music” or 
other kinds of abject art—brings about alternative constructions of 
subjectivity from aesthetic experience. The subject thus created presents a 
different capacity of selfhood not constituted by means of bourgeois 
rationalism and its Cartesian ghost. Moreover, it is a capacity of the subject 
that had been rendered invisible by previous constructions of the 
relationship between reason and emotion. Kristeva and Adorno both want 
to make the invisible visible again. The newly transformed subjectivity must 
be encountered through aesthetic provocations so as not to ontologize pain 
and suffering, but to keep alive the memory of past harm in order to 
confront its possible futurity. The aesthetic in this manner agitates against 
future actual harm through the dissent internal to its unique way of 
speaking and being heard. This process resists the reification of overly 
subjectivized i.e. commodified and fetishized bodies as subjects in the 
bourgeois space of private capital, as well as the anesthetization of all 
feeling.  
In his 2013 publication, The Fleeting Promise of Art: Adorno’s ‘Aesthetic 
Theory’ Revisted, Peter Uwe Hohendahl has also made this clear in his 
reconsideration of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. Hohendahl combines Adorno’s 
recasting of Kantian natural beauty with the necessity of the sublime in 
twentieth century aesthetics and emphasizes the role of ugliness in modern 
art. In his review of Hohendahl’s Adorno reading, David Roberts writes:  
The concept of the ugly has a number of interrelated 
functions in [Adorno’s] Aesthetic Theory. It protests against 
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the commercialization of beauty; it points back behind the 
civilized semblance of art to art’s primitive origins in myth 
and ritual and highlights the changing socio-historical 
purposes of art. The salience of the sublime in modern art 
can thus be read as a return of the repressed, of mythic 
terror. This unresolved dissonance of the archaic in the 
modern exemplifies the entwinement of enlightenment 
and myth as a dialectic of civilization, which calls 
conventional notions of progress into question.67 
Hence Adorno’s aesthetics might be just what critical theory needs today in 
conversation with recent efforts to decolonize its normative commitments to 
progress.68 
Related to Adorno’s turn to the sublime and regard for the necessity of 
ugliness in modern art, we can return to Kristeva’s work on the powers of 
horror and the affects of the abject. Sara Ahmed writes: “It is not that what is 
abject is what has got inside from the outside; the abject turns us inside out 
as well as outside in. Hence, Kristeva suggests that, in abjection, borders 
become transformed into objects.”69 The abject dimensions of subjectivity 
become objectivized through the social situation of the artwork. The 
affectivity of the subject that has lost its ‘inner self’ reveals the primacy of 
the object—as another object of sense experience and emotion. The 
affectivity turns the subject inside out, transforming an empty space that can 
only grasp the margins of what it is not into a new object to be sensed and 
experienced in a concretely material way. This maneuver from Kristevan 
scholarship calls for the end of imperial subjectivity, and in turn, the 
primacy of the object, which furthermore enables thinking new 
constellations of collectivity capable of political action. 70 
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Adorno Studies,  April 29, 2016, Graduate Philosophy Department, University of Montreal. 
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